Journal of the National Association of
Administrative Law Judiciary
Volume 20

Issue 2

Article 2

10-15-2000

Judicial Review of Forest Service Decisions Made Pursuant to the
National Forest Management Act's Substantive Requirements:
Time for a Science Court?
Kristen Potter

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj
Part of the Administrative Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, Natural Resources Law
Commons, and the Science and Technology Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Kristen Potter, Judicial Review of Forest Service Decisions Made Pursuant to the National Forest
Management Act's Substantive Requirements: Time for a Science Court?, 20 J. Nat’l Ass’n Admin. L.
Judges. (2000)
available at https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/naalj/vol20/iss2/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Caruso School of Law at Pepperdine Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law
Judiciary by an authorized editor of Pepperdine Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
bailey.berry@pepperdine.edu.

Judicial Review of Forest Service Decisions Made
Pursuant to the National Forest Management Act's
Substantive Requirements: Time for a Science Court?
Kristen Potter*
I. HISTORY OF FOREST LAW AND MANAGEMENT .......
A. Legislation Before 1976 ............................
B. The National Forest Management Act .............
II. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE FOREST SERVICE ACTION
UNDER THE NATIONAL FOREST MANAGEMENT ACT..
A. Deference to Agency Decisions ....................
1. Separation of Powers ..........................
2. Agency Expertise .............................
3. Arbitrary and Capricious Review .............
B. Scope of Judicial Review ..........................

III.

247
248
248
249
249
250

EXAMPLES OF DEFERENTIAL REVIEW IN THE

CONTEXT OF NFMA's DIVERSITY REQUIREMENT ....
A. Sierra Club v. Marita ..............................
B. Inland Empire Public Lands Council v. United
States Forest Service ...............................
C. Sierra Club v. Martin ..............................
IV.

242
242
245

Is

9
THE SOLUTION A SCIENCE COURT

...

.. . . . . . . .. . . . .

A. Benefits and Shortcomings of a Science Court.....
V . CONCLUSION ...........................................

251
252
253
255
256
257
261

Judicial review of U.S. Forest Service (Forest Service) decisions
made under the National Forest Management Act (NFMA) plays
an essential role in the protection of one of the nation's most
precious resources, National Forests.' Absent judicial oversight,
the Forest Service would go unchecked and could violate NFMA
with little consequence. Traditionally, the Forest Service decisions
* Associate, David W. Owens PC & Associates, Portland, OR; LL.M. Environmental and Natural Resources Law, Cum Laude, Northwestern School of Law of
Lewis & Clark College; J.D., High Honors; Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois
Institute of Technology.
1. This article's focus on NFMA is not meant to overlook the significant impact
of other laws, such as the Endangered Species Act, the National Environmental
Protection Act, or the Clean Water Act on the management of national forests.
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enjoyed great deference by the courts. Many hoped the structure
and substance of NFMA and its regulations would provide a much
less deferential role for the courts. However, it is unclear whether
this has uniformly been the effect. Additionally, courts struggle in
reviewing issues steeped in the continuously evolving science of
forest ecosystems and management, leaving many critical of the
excessive deference afforded to the agency. As a result, critics
proposed creating specialized or science courts, better versed in the
technical aspects of forest ecosystems. However, even with all the
valid criticisms of the present system, a specialized court does not
provide a satisfactory solution.
This article is divided into five sections. Section I reviews the
legal and historical background of forest law, culminating in
NFMA, and establishes why many believe that the NFMA
provides a greater role for courts. Section II presents the
underpinnings of judicial review and deference to administrative
agencies, such as the Forest Service. Section III provides examples
of the deference applied in challenges to the Forest Service's
attempted compliance with NFMA's diversity requirements.
Section IV discusses the benefits and shortcomings of a specialized
court in addressing the criticisms of the present system. Section V
concludes that a specialized court is not the best remedy.
I.

HISTORY OF FOREST LAW AND MANAGEMENT

A.

Legislation Before 1976

In 1891, Congress passed the Creative Act, authorizing the President to create forest reserves by setting aside lands in the public
domain. a As a result, approximately thirteen million acres were set
aside as reserves over the next several years. However, no funds
were appropriated to allow for federal management of the newly
reserved lands.4
2. See Creative Act, ch. 561, § 24; OR. REV. STAT. § 1095, 1103 (1891) (repealed
by OR. REV. STAT. § 2792 (1976)); see also Charles F. Wilkinson & Michael H. Anderson, Land and Resource Planning in the National Forests, 64 OR. L. REV. 1, 17-18

(1985).
3. See Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 2, at 18.
4. Jack Tuholske & Beth Brennan, The National ForestManagement Act: Judicial
Interpretation of a Substantive Environmental Statute, 15 PuB. LAND L. REV. 53, 58
(1994).
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5
Not until Congress passed the Organic Administration Act (Or-

ganic Act) in 1897 did it authorize and provide direction for forest
6
management and provide appropriations therefor. The Act's foci
were timber harvest and protection of water quality and quantity,
as evidenced by the purposes it established for the national forests:
"to improve and protect the forests within the boundaries, or for
the purpose of securing favorable conditions of water flows, and
a continuous supply of timber ....

",

Nevertheless, the pur-

poses provided little more than vague guidance which instilled the
Forest Service with broad discretion to manage as it deemed
appropriate.
The Organic Act remained the primary controlling legal authority for forest management until Congress passed the Multiple-Use
Sustained-Yield Act (MUSYA) in 1960.8 MUSYA changed the
Forest Service's management mandate by broadening the purposes
from timber production and protection of water quality and quantity to include the promotion and protection of recreation, wildlife,
and fish and range resources. 9 While the MUSYA's recognition of
multiple uses for the nation's forests was significant, in practice the
statute did not effectively shift the Service's narrow focus away
from natural resource extraction and use such as timber production.10 Likely, the maintenance of the status quo resulted from the
MUSYA's lack of substantive standards for decision making and
incorporating multiple uses. The MUSYA merely required the
Forest Service to give different resources "due consideration" in its
management efforts." As a result, no concrete standards existed
which would allow parties to successfully bring legal challenges to
Forest Service action. Consequently, the agency maintained signifsuccessful in
icant discretion under the MUSYA and was extremely
2
act.'
the
to
pursuant
brought
the limited challenges
5. Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 2, at 18 n. 58.
6. Taholske & Brennan, supra note 4, at 58.
7. 16 U.S.C. § 475 (1982).

8. See Pub. L. No. 86-517, § 1; 74 Stat. 215 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-531).
9. See 16 U.S.C. § 528 (1982).
10. Tuholske & Brennan, supra note 4, at 59-60 (noting the increase in annual
harvest from 8 billion board feet in 1959 to 12 billion board feet in 1966 as evidence of
the Forest Service maintaining timber production as its priority); DAVID A. CLARY,

3, 156-63 (1986).
11. 16 U.S.C. § 529 (1982).
12. The oft-quoted passage from Perkins v. Bergland, 608 F.2d 803, 806 (9th Cir.
1979) (quoting Strickland v. Morton, 519 F.2d 467, 469 (9th Cir. 1975)), that the

TIMBER AND THE FOREST SERVICE
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In the mid-1960's, the environmental movement began to have
increasing impacts on politics in the United States and specifically
on Forest Service mandates and practices.13 The public, and ultimately Congress, began to express -deep concern for federal forest
practices including excessive clearcutting. 14 As a result, the Bolle
Report was issued in 1970 decrying the Forest Service's management practices.15 Specifically, the report criticized the Forest Service's emphasis on timber harvest while ignoring MUSYA's
multiple use mandate.' 6 The report led to Senate investigatory
hearings on the wisdom and use of clearcutting, which became
known as the "Church Hearings.' 1 7 Like the Bolle Report, the
Church Hearings focussed on the Forest Service's overemphasis on
timber production and extensive reliance on clearcutting.' 8 The
hearings resulted in the "Church Guidelines," which proposed a
number of limitations on timber harvests, including a regeneration
requirement, protection of soil and watersheds, and size of
clearcuts.' 9 Congress did not immediately enact the Church
Guidelines into law; however, they laid the groundwork for and
NFMA and many of the specific limitations were ultimately incorporated almost verbatim into NFMA. 20
Beyond the substantive management oriented concerns expressed by the Bolle Report and the Church Hearings, Congress
was also troubled by the Forest Service's lack of uniform planning
for all resources. 2 1 As a result, Congress passed the Forest RangeMUSYA "breathes discretion at every pore" summarizes judicial review under the
MUSYA. Tuholske & Brennan, supra note 4, at 60.
13. See generally Tuholske & Brennan, supra note 4 (discussing the environmental movement and its political and social force in the 1960s and 1970s).
14. The term "clearcutting" is used to describe various silvicultural practices in
which all trees in a specific area are removed, allowing for seeding, artificial or natu-

ral, of a single-age stand of trees.

SUBCOMM. ON PUBLIC LANDS OF THE SENATE

COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, CLEARCUTTING ON FEDERAL TIMBER-

LANDS, 92d Cong. (2d Sess. Comm. Print 1972) [hereinafter CHURCH COMMITTEE
HEARINGS].

15. At the request of Senator Metcalf (D-Montana), Arnold Bolle, then-dean of
the Forestry School at the University of Montana, prepared the Bolle Report. Senator Metcalfe asked Bolle to investigate timber harvest practices on the Bitterroot National Forest. Arnold W. Bolle, The Bitterroot Revisited: A University Review of the
Forest Service, 10 PUB. LAND L. REV. 1, 8 (1989).
16. See id.

17.

CHURCH COMMITTEE HEARINGS,

supra note 13. The late Senator Church

(D-Idaho) chaired the hearings. Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 2, at 138.
18. See Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 2, at 141-45.
19. Tuholske & Brennan, supra note 4, at 62.
20. Id. at 63.
21. Id.

Judicial Review of Forest Service Decisions

Fall 2000

land and Renewable Resources Planning Act of 1974 (RPA).22
The RPA, in an attempt to improve funding to enable the Service
to meet national goals for Forest Service Planning, requires the
Forest Service to plan through the lens of nationwide goals and
objectives.2 3 To this end, the RPA requires a resource assessment,2 4 a program setting long-term objectives and costs, 25 and annual reporting requirements.26
Despite the Church Guidelines and the RPA, the public remained circumspect of the Service's clearcutting practices. This
concern culminated in litigation involving the Monongahela National Forest in West Virginia in which the Fourth Circuit held that
the Organic Act effectively prohibited clearcutting in national forests. 27 Recognizing that this declaration jeopardized the entire timber sale program, Congress responded with NFMA.28
B.

The National Forest Management Act

NFMA, passed in 1976, after nearly two years of extensive debate, contains not only procedural requirements, but also embodies
several substantive requirements. 29 NFMA's procedural requirements expand the RPA's forest planning guidelines by requiring
the Forest Service to develop and periodically revise forest plans
for 156 separate units in the National Forest System.3 ° Congress,
22. Pub. L. No. 93-378, 2d Sess. (1974), 88 Stat. 476 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. §§ 1600-1614).
23. Tuholske & Brennan, supra note 4, at 63.
24. 16 U.S.C. § 1601(a). The Renewable Resource Assessment must be prepared every ten years.
25. Id. § 1602. The Renewable Resource Program requires a planning document
every five years.
26. Id. § 1606(c). The Annual Report compares the Forest Service's actual activities with those proposed under the Renewable Resource Program.
27. West Va. Div. Of the Izaak Walton League of Am. v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945 (4th
Cir. 1975). See Fredrico Cheever, Four Failed Forest Service Standards:What We Can
Learn From the History of the National Forest Management Act's Substantive Timber
Management Provisions, 77 OR. L. REV. 601, 625-32 (1998) (discussing the Monongahela litigation in-depth).
28. TIholske & Brennan, supra note 4, at 64; Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note
2, at 155.
29. Tuholske & Brennan, supra note 4, at 65. See also Cheever, supra note 27, at
633-43 (containing an in-depth discussion of the bills proposed and the Congressional
hearings involving NFMA's passage).
30. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(a) & (c) (1994). While commonly called "forest plans,"
§ 1604 refers to land and resource management plans. See George C. Coggins, The
Developing Law of Land Use Planning on Federal Lands, 61 U. CoLo. L. REV. 307,
336-44 (1990) (containing an overview of NFMA's planning scheme and
requirements).
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understanding that successful forest management requires the application of scientific knowledge to the needs the country seeks to
meet through the National Forest System, overlaid the planning
process with substantive provisions. The provisions include: that
the Forest Service promulgate regulations specifying guidelines for
Forest Plans that will maintain diversity of plant and animal communities, 3 ' monitor and evaluate the effects of management
practices,32 permit increased harvest under certain conditions,33 determine suitable lands for harvest, 34 and impose limits on even-age
management.35
However, cognizant of its own lack of scientific expertise and
that scientific principles relevant to forest management would continue to evolve, Congress refrained from including concrete definitions and methodologies within the substantive requirements.
Instead, Congress obliged the Secretary of Agriculture to appoint a
scientific advisory committee (Committee) to aid the Service in
promulgating NFMA's implementing regulations.36 Three years after NFMA passed, the Committee issued a final report on proposed regulations.37 Taking direction from NFMA, the Committee
focused on specific planning procedures. 38 It felt that the regulations should not be specific in regard to prescriptions for on-theground management. 39 Instead, the Committee entrusted the Service with discretion for specific management decisions, discretion it
expected the agency to exercise consistent with contemporary scientific understanding.40 The regulations implementing NFMA
were finally completed in 1982.
In spite of the Committee's own recognition that NFMA and its
regulations are deferential to the Forest Service, the overall
scheme is a profound change from Congress' traditional attitude of
31. 16 U.S.C. § 1604(g)(3)(B).
32. Id. at § 1604(g)(3)(C).

33. Id. at § 1604(g)(3)(D).
34. Id. at § 1604(g)(3)(E).
35. Id. at § 1604(g)(3)(F). The Committee was required to be composed of
scientists outside of the agency.
36. Id. at § 1604(h)(1).
37. National Forest System Land and Resource Management Planning, 44 Fed.
Reg. 26,554, 26,599 (1979).

38. Id. at 26,609.
39. Id.
40. Id.; Greg D. Corbin, The United States Forest Services Response to Biodiversity Science, 29 ENVTL. L. 377, 388-98 (1999); Cheever, supra note 27, at 649-56.
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almost absolute deference.41 Its passage was heralded as "the most
adventurous congressional incursion into the on-the-ground activities of the United States Forest Service."'42 The substantive limitations and detailed procedural requirements give courts more law to
apply, and therefore more ability to keep the Service in check.43
However, as described below, well-settled principles of administrative law have dampened some of this effect.
II.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE FOREST SERVICE ACTION UNDER
THE NATIONAL FOREST MANAGEMENT ACT

Citizen groups challenging Forest Service actions pursuant to
NFMA's substantive requirements face many obstacles. Initially,
they must overcome the several procedural barriers, such as standing, exhaustion and ripeness, before the court will even review the
substance of their claims.4 4 Once a citizen group "gets into the
courthouse door," as compared to the Forest Service, it still faces
significant disadvantages. 45 Among these disadvantages are the
many investigators and other personnel of the Forest Service, gathering evidence, preparing documents, and providing testimony, and
the representation of experienced Justice Department Attorneys.46
Potentially more significant, though, are the deference and the
limited scope of review that the courts often give to Forest Service
actions. Even though Congress intention in enacting NFMA, was
to rein in some of the discretion and deference previously granted
to the Forest Service in managing the national forests,47 many
courts continue to grant a high level of deference to Forest Service
action. Several commentators have questioned the wisdom of this
approach and the reasons for the agency discretion and
deference.48
41. See Tuholske & Brennan, supra note 4,at 54; Stephanie M. Parent, The National Forest Management Act: Out of the Woods and Back to the Courts?, 22 ENVTL.

L. 699, 711 (1992).
42. Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 2, at 7.
43. Parent, supra note 41, at 711.
44. See Tuholske & Brennan, supra note 4, at 106-20. Standing and ripeness are

not just procedural barriers, but, importantly are also Constitutional requirements.
45. Tuholske & Brennan, supra note 4, at 106.
46. Edward C. Fritz, BroadeningJudicial Review Under the National Forest Management Act, 3 Wis. ENVTL. L.J. 27, 28 (1996).
47. Wilkinson & Anderson, supra note 2, at 67-72.
48. See infra Section III.
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Deference to Agency Decisions

The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA) contains rules
that establish the relationship between reviewing courts and administrative agencies, such as the Forest Service.4 9 Previous to and
since the enactment of the APA, the appropriate deference afforded to agency decision-making has been "inexact and unexplained science."' 50 However, as stated above, under modem
administrative law, courts afford great deference to agency interpretation and exercise of its authority. Discussed below are a
couple of reasons for this phenomenon and the application of discretion through § 706 of the APA.
1.

Separation of Powers

First, the Separation of Powers doctrine can limit judicial review. Congress, through powers granted by the Constitution, has
the authority to delegate rulemaking to agencies within the executive branch. As our government and society become increasingly
complex, this delegation becomes increasingly necessary to successfully carry out governmental functions. Once Congress properly delegates authority to an agency, the agency, in a sense, takes
on legislative functions. Congress' requirement that the Forest
Service, with the advice and counsel of the Committee, promulgate
rules and policy under NFMA is a clear example. Even without
this kind of explicit delegation, courts find that Congress implicitly
delegates discretion to agencies to make rules and policy. 2 Similarly, agencies, such as the Forest Service, are located in the Executive branch. The Supreme Court has reasoned that while agencies
are not directly accountable to the public, the Chief Executive and
Congress are and thus it is appropriate that agencies make policy
choices.5 3 Therefore, under this theory, the courts should not impermissibly interfere with the other branches' constitutional and
delegated functions. In essence, courts merely should ensure that
49. 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1996).
50. Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth
Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency
Decisions, 1987 DUKE L.J. 387 (1987).
51. The Separation of Powers doctrine has also been construed by courts to
broaden judicial review of agency decisions in the form of the Non-Delegation doctrine, which until recently was dead-letter, however.
52. See Chevron, U.S.A, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844-45
(1984).
53. Id.
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agencies are acting within the parameters of the congressionally
delegated authority. As a result, agency decisions deserve judicial
deference.
2.

Agency Expertise

Second, agencies are considered specialized institutions that
Congress empowers to make decisions due to their increased
knowledge of the subject matter for which they are delegated responsibility. Therefore, deference is customary when the agency
has technical and scientific expertise that is applied to complex
management issues or rulemaking problems. 54 This reasoning is especially prevalent in environmental context such as forestry practices and management. The Supreme Court clearly enunciated the
high level of deference agency action should be accorded in Marsh
v. Oregon Natural Resources Council.55 The Court stated, "because analysis of the relevant documents requires a high level of
technical expertise," we must defer to "the informed discretion of
the responsible federal agencies. '56 Courts have found that "expert" agencies are entitled to discretion even if the court determines that views of contrasting agencies are more persuasive.5 7
3.

Arbitrary and Capricious Review

The deferential standard which applies to judicial review of most
claims under NFMA is articulated in section 706 of the APA: the
"arbitrary and capricious" standard. 58 To determine whether the
Forest Service action is arbitrary and capricious, the court must determine whether the Forest Service "consider[ed] [all] of the relevant factors and whether [or not] there was a clear error of
judgment. '59 However, the courts should not simply rubberstamp
the agency's determinations. Agency actions must be reversed
when the agency fails to "examine the relevant data and articulate
54. Jon. A. Souder & Sally K. Fairfax, Arbitrary Administrators, Capricious Bureaucrats and Prudent Trustees: Does it Matter in the Review, 18 PUB. LAND & RE-

L. REV. 165 (1997).
55. 490 U.S. 360 (1989).

SOURCES

56. Id. at 377.
57. Id. at 378.

58. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2)(a).
59. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) (abrogated by Calitano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977).
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a satisfactory explanation for its action including a 'rational con60
nection between the facts found and the choice made."'
A deferential standard applies to the Forest Service's interpretation of regulations and statutes61 and to its methodology and factual determinations. 62 Courts accord the greatest deference when
reviewing the Service's choice of scientific methods by which it collects and generates data to use in decision making and to its ultimate factual determinations. 63 As referenced earlier, this
deference is a result of the courts' unwillingness, as a body of
generalist judges, to second-guess the agency's scientific and technical expertise, which is required in many areas of forest management.64 Moreover, the Supreme Court stated that a court must be
most deferential when reviewing an agency determination involv'65
ing technical issues at the "frontiers of science.
B.

Scope of Judicial Review

The foundation for judicial review is the record of the Service at
the time that the decision under review was made. 66 Typically,
courts should not look beyond the record by admitting new evidence. 67 The reasoning behind this limitation is similar to that
upon which discretion is based: "consideration of evidence outside
the record undermines the administrative process and opens the
60. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
(1983) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168
(1962)).
61. Deference to legal interpretation of the Forest Service's own regulations is
higher than that of the statutes.
62. Tuholske & Brennan, supra note 4, at 128.
63. Id.
64. See e.g. Cronin v. United States Dep't of Agric., 919 F.2d 439, 444 (7th Cir.
1990) (characterizing forestry as a technical field requiring almost absolute deference
by "generalist judges"); see also supra Section II.C.
65. Baltimore Gas & Elec. Co. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council (Vermont Yankee IV),
462 U.S. 87, 105-06 (1983).
66. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 420.
67. There are exceptions to this general rule, but they are rare. For example,
under NFMA, courts have accepted and considered additional evidence offered by
citizen groups in order to assist the court in understanding complex environmental
issues. See Tuholske & Brennan, supra note 4, at 122-24 (discussing a handful of cases
in which courts have considered evidence outside the record). See also Ronald M.
Levin, Scope-of-Review Doctrine Restated: An Administrative Law Section Report, 38
ADMIN. L. REV. 239, 273 (1986) (discussing the "substantial evidence" standard by
which courts measure whether the evidence supports the administrative hearing
conclusion).
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door for the court to substitute its judgment for that of the
agency. "68
As a practical matter, limiting review to the record increases the
advantages afforded to the Forest Service in defending its actions
under NFMA in court. The record in Forest Service decisions is
usually developed informally by line officers and field personnel.69
Scientific studies and reviews critical of the Service's decisions are
sometimes only included in the record by way of the administrative
appeals process.7 ° Citizen groups involved in the administrative
appeals process are not required to (and rarely do) have legal representation. 7 1 The appeals process does not include a formal hearing, nor is the decision made after independent review by an
administrative law judge. 72 Furthermore, the time frame for an appeal is short, allowing little time for significant information gathering and development of studies and analysis. 73 Therefore, when
the record reaches a reviewing court, the record is usually limited
in scope and weighted heavily in favor of the materials prepared by
the Forest Service to support its determinations.74
III.

EXAMPLES OF DEFERENTIAL REVIEW IN THE CONTEXT OF

NFMA's

DIVERSITY REQUIREMENT

As stated above, judicial deference to the Forest Service is applied to almost every sort of decision, even to statutory interpretation,75 which is typically within the province of the courts.76
68. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 416; see also Tuholske & Brennan, supra note 4, at
121 ("When the administrative record reaches the district court it can be fairly limited
in scope, and is heavily weighted in favor of materials prepared by the Forest
Service.").
69. Tuholske & Brennan, supra note 4, at 121. The process by which the Forest
Service typically makes decisions is informal in nature. It is hard to categorize the
process as purely rulemaking or adjudication, however, typically it is more like the
latter. In contrast, in formal adjudication the record is significantly more in depth
because the process is an adversarial, trial-like proceeding in which the evidence is
admitted and witnesses are heard and cross-examined.
70. See id.; see also 36 C.F.R. § 217 (1999) (governing administrative appeals of
Forest Service decisions made pursuant to NFMA).
71. Tuholske & Brennan, supra note 4, at 121.
72. Id.
73. See id.
74. Id.
75. Unless, of course, it is clearly inconsistent with the plain meaning of the statutory language.
76. See id. The court will defer to "reasonable agency determination when the
statutory language is broad or ambiguous."
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However, the willingness of courts to almost blindly defer to the
agency's discretion without significant explanation is most pervasive when reviewing scientific methodological and factual determinations.77 This is not to suggest that the Forest Service always
avoids courts that are unwilling to restrict their discretion with respect to scientific decisions in light of NFMA's substantive requirements. 78 A review of cases involving challenges to the Service's
compliance with NFMA's substantive provisions requiring biodiversity exemplifies the tensions between unquestioning deference, or rubberstamping, and a probing review requiring adequate
explanations for decisions.79
A.

Sierra Club v. Marita

In Sierra Club v. Marita,80 the plaintiffs challenged the Forest
Service's plans regarding two National Forests in Wisconsin. 81 Specifically, the plaintiffs criticized the agency's unwillingness to apply
conservation biology principles82 in the forest plans. 83 Instead of
providing for the "sufficiently large" blocks of contiguous habitat
that the plaintiffs claim are required for biodiversity, and are championed by conservation biology, the Forest Service's plans created
"a patchwork of different habitats. "84 The Forest Service relied on
extrapolation of habitat information. Specifically, the agency used
timber data to split the forest into different types of habitat and
then determined the diversity of the wildlife by assessing diversity
of habitat without actually assessing populations on the ground.85
The plaintiffs' criticism of the Service's methodology was not made
without significant support; 86 the court had over a hundred scien77.
78.
79.
80.
81.

See Tuholske & Brennan, supra note 4, at 169, 129.
See id. at 129.
See id. at 128-29.
46 F.3d 606, 609 (7th Cir. 1995).
See id.

82. Conservation biology principles require leaving large tracts of habitat areas
to protect biodiversity. See generally Patricia Smith King, Applying Daubert to the
"Hard Look" Requirement of NEPA: Scientific Evidence Before the Forest Service in
Sierra Club v. Marita, 2 Wis. ENVTL. L.J. 147, 159-62 (providing an introduction to
principles of conservation biology); Reed F. Noss, Some Principles of Conservation
Biology, As they apply to EnvironmentalLaw, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 893 (1994) (discussing the general principles of conservation biology).
83. Marita, 46 F.3d at 610.
84. Id. at 617.
85. See id.; see also Corbin, supra note 40, at 404-06 (citing WILLIAM S. ALVERSON ET AL., WILD FORESTS: CONSERVATION BIOLOGY AND PUBLIC POLICY

(1994)).

86. See Marita, 46 F.3d at 618.
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tific articles, thirteen affidavits, and amicus briefs from well
respected scientific institutions supporting the plaintiffs' position at
87
its access.
The court in Marita,seemingly ignoring all of the information in
front of it, found that the agency's action was not arbitrary and
capricious.88 The court avoided discussing the merits of conservation biology. 89 Rather, it accepted the agency's bare assertion that,
although it had considered conservation biology as a method to
meet its biodiversity mandate, the principles were uncertain as applied to the particular forests. 90 The plaintiffs, attempting to discredit this argument as an "adequate explanation" for ignoring the
teachings, indicated to the court the basic nature of science inquiry
always results in some level of uncertainty and can never be tested
at every location. 91 Furthermore, the amici scientific societies contend that, by allowing the Service to use this weak explanation, the
court would, in effect, insulate the agency from ever considering
scientific advances. 92 This result is directly contrary to the Scientific Committee's intent in the regulations. 93 As a result, the court
expanded the agency's discretion beyond what should be afforded
to an "expert" agency, by seemingly rubberstamping the decision
in the face of basic principles that suggested it was not consistent
with fundamental principles widely accepted in conservation biology and a large part of the scientific community.
B.

Inland Empire Public Lands Council v. United States
Forest Service

In Inland Empire Public Lands Council v. United States Forest
Service, 4 plaintiffs challenged eight timber sales in the Kootenai
National Forest in Montana. 95 Plaintiffs urged that the Service violated NFMA because it did not provide an adequate population
viability analysis for species recognized as sensitive in the forest
87. See id. at 618-22.
88. Id. at 621-24; but see King, supra note 82, at 162-67; Corbin, supra note 40, at
400-02 (describing how conservation biology principles were generally accepted at
that time).
89. See Marita, 46 F.3d at 621.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 622.
92. See id.; see also Corbin, supra note 41, at 405-06 (summarizing plaintiff's and
amicus argument regarding scientific uncertainty).
93. 36 C.F.R. § 219.19 (1999).
94. 88 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 1996).
95. Id. at 758.
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plan. 96 Specifically, the plaintiffs criticized the analysis because it
did not include any estimation of species' population or related information or analysis, such as actual population size, trends within
the population, and intra-population dynamics between bordering
forests.97 Instead, the Service relied on extrapolations of studies of
a few sensitive species that simply included estimating the number
of individuals in the population by calculating the acreage in the
planning area. 98 The Forest Service defended its analysis as sufficient to meet NFMA requirements. 99 While the Forest Service's
analysis may have been sufficient, current scientific norms suggested otherwise. 100
The court in Inland Empire initially recognized that NFMA's
mandate included a substantive duty to protect biodiversity and
that the viability requirement "applie[d] with special force to 'sensitive' species."1 °1 Even so, the court concluded that the manner
by which the Service satisfied the requirement was entitled to deferential review, especially because "questions of scientific methodology [were] involved."10 2 As a result, under the arbitrary and
capricious standard, with scant discussion as to why the agency
made a "reasonable assumption" that habitat acreage was directly
related to population size absent actual measurement of population, the court deferred to the agency. 10 3 Additionally, the court
found that it was not arbitrary and capricious for the Service to
settle for a "less rigorous" analysis for species unlikely to be affected by management activities and to forego analysis of species'
habitat requirements if the requisite data is not available. 10 4 This
deference was accorded even though sensitive species were at
96. Id. (The species included lynx, boreal owl, flammulated owl, black-backed
woodpecker, fisher, bull charr, and west-sloped cutthroat trout).
97. Id. at 758-60; see also Corbin, supra note 40, 399-400, n. 186 (supporting the
assertion that studying biological populations requires an estimate of the population
size).
98. Inland Empire, 88 F.3d at 759 (discussing the studies used by the Forest
Service).
99. See id.
100. Id. at 759; see also Corbin, supra note 40, at 400.
101. Inland Empire, 88 F.3d at 759 (noting that the NFMA imposes substantive
duties on the forest service.).
102. Id. at 760.
103. Id. at 761. The practical result of this decision is that the Service can rely on
existing habitat data already in its possession, likely timber inventories, to make a
calculation of individuals in a population absent actually counting the individuals. As
a result, actual changes in the population may go undetected and viability will be
assumed if a requisite amount of acres remain. Corbin, supra note 40, at 401.
104. See Inland Empire, 88 F.3d at 761-62.

Fall 2000

Judicial Review of Forest Service Decisions

stake, and even though NFMA contains specific monitoring
requirements. 105
C. Sierra Club v. Martin
In Sierra Club v. Martin,'10 6 plaintiffs challenged multiple timber
sales in two national forests in Georgia. 10 7 Plaintiffs argued that
the sales would adversely affect wildlife, contrary to the Forest Service's determination. 0 8 Specifically, similar to Inland Empire,
plaintiffs asserted that the agency violated NFMA by failing to obtain and consider population inventories and population trend
data, instead relying on habitat monitoring to assess diversity and
viability. 10 9 In contrast, the Service argued that the habitat data it
collected was adequate to indicate that the sites of the timber sales
either do not have a high potential for occupancy of species, 110 or,
in the alternative, demonstrated the continued viability of the species that do occupy the area."' Further, the Forest Service asserted that it was entitled to deference because it was within its
discretion to make determinations of potential impacts relying on
information other than population inventories." 2
Unlike the courts in Marita and Inland Empire, the Martin court
rejected the agency's arguments. The court reversed the action as
arbitrary and capricious, finding that the Service failed to "examine
the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation" including no "rational connection between" the Service's determination
that actual population data versus habitat extrapolation was required to form its viability assessment. 113 This is significant because it seems to directly reject the deference afforded by the court
in Inland Empire."4 However, it is important to note that the
court did not overturn the agency's decision by necessarily ac105. See id.
106. 128 F.3d 1 (11th Cir. 1999).

107. Id.
108. Id. at 3.
109. Id. at 4.
110. Species, for this purpose, encompasses what the court called PETS, or proposed, endangered, threatened or sensitive species. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 5.
114. See id. at 7, n.10 (stating that "we respectfully differ with the Ninth Circuit's
conclusion ... that habitat analyses suffice to satisfy the requirements of 36 C.F.R.
§ 219.19." However, the court did go on to note that the Inland Empire court was
faced with a "very different set of facts").
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cepting or rejecting the science and methodology used by the
agency in light of proposed superior science and methodology per
se. Rather, the court was very careful in basing its decision on interpretation of NFMA, its regulations, and the forest plans
themselves." 5
IV.

Is THE SOLUTION A SCIENCE COURT?

In light of discrepancies like those outlined in the cases above,
between both the Forest Service scientists and outside scientists,
and widely accepted principles and the potential outcomes in different courts, one wonders if things need to be changed. Some
commentators feel that the deference afforded to the Forest Service by the courts, even keeping the widely-held criticism by others
in the scientific community in mind, is entirely appropriate and a
necessary part of the administrative governmental system. As discussed above in section II(A), the Forest Service, not the courts,
are charged with creating policy for the management of national
forests. That policy often includes a determination of the risks and
the uncertainties, which the agency charged with managing the forests, is willing to accept.
Further, contrary to the general population's belief that science
is exact, neutral, and can produce a single "right answer" on how
the forest should be managed, 1 6 ecosystems are "more complex
than we think" and scientific knowledge is constantly advancing.17
Additionally, some urge that excessive intrusiveness of the courts
limits the Forest Service's ability to carry out its mandate in a
timely and efficient fashion because it impedes long-term planning
18
and priority-setting.
115. See id. at 5 (pointing to several instances where the Forest Service ignored
its own conclusions and the clear language of the forest plan).
116. See Jane Maienschein, Biology and Law: Challenges of Adjudicating Competing Claims in a Democracy, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 151, 158-64 (1998) (discussing the
changing nature of science in relation to the law).
117. See Julie A. Weis, Eliminating the National Forest Management Act's Diversity Requirement as a Substantive Standard, 27 ENVTL. L. 641, 653-54 (citing Reed F.
Ross, Some Principles of Conservation Biology, As the Apply to Environmental Law,
69 CH.-KENT L. REV. 893, 898 (1994)). To emphasize this point, Ross stated that
"ecosystems are not only more complex than we think, but more complex than we can
think" and "while understanding ecosystem structure and function is a difficult
enough task to humble the finest scientist, it seems more daunting to the finest legal
minds." Id. at 653-54.
118. See Richard N.L. Andrews, Long-Range Planning in Environmental and
Health Regulatory Agencies, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 515, 545-46 (1993); see also Patricia

Fall 2000

Judicial Review of Forest Service Decisions
Judicial Review of Forest Service Decisions

Fall 2000

On the other hand, many are disenchanted with the Forest Service's actions and the courts' deference thereto, as is readily made
apparent by the vast amount of legal challenges brought against
the Service each year. This may be based on several factors, including: the track record of the Forest Service in the past, the pervasiveness of the one-time largely predominant focus on timber
production and resource extraction at the expense of wildlife and
aesthetics, the level in the Forest Service at which significant decisions are actually made,119 and political factors such as the influence of powerful timber companies on the processes. This is
exacerbated by the advantages, beyond deference, which the Forest Service enjoys when litigating the challenges. 2 °
In the face of similar criticisms in other areas of environmental
and administrative law, some have proposed the creation of specialized or science courts, institutions designed to deal with factual
technical issues.' 2 ' While specialized courts present an appealing
option for those disenchanted with the present system, the wisdom
and practicality of such courts have often been criticized, as discussed below. Several different forms of courts have been proposed. For my purposes, I limit my analysis to Article III Courts
for which a judge or panel is appointed based on his or her special
background knowledge in the science involved in forestry and
ecosystem management.
A.

Benefits and Shortcomings of a Science Court

There are several arguments in favor of specialized review of administrative action. First, proponents maintain that a specialized
Wald, Regulations at Risk: Are Courts Part of the Solution or Most of the Problem, 67
S. CAL. L. REV. 621, 625-29 (1994) (discussing the theory that the extensive requirements substantially slow the agency's progress).
119. Specifically, local managers are responsible for forest plans and some argue
that the local influence of the communities dependent upon the resources play too

significant a role.
120. See supra, Section II.
121. See Arthur Kantrowitz, Controlling Technology Democratically, 63 AM. SciENTIST 505 (1975); Joel Yellin, Science, Technology, and Administrative Government.
Institutional Designs for Environmental Decisionmaking,92 YALE L.J. 1300, 1301 n.3
(1983) (stating that reformers believed that social and economic welfare would be

promoted by "expert" decision-making); Harold H. Bruff, CoordinatingJudicial Review in Administrative Law, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 1193 (1992) (discussing five possible

methods for reducing the disadvantages of decentralization without increasing the
need for Supreme Court intervention, including the creation of a specialized Administrative Court).
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court will promote consistency and uniformity of decisions. 122 Because the Forest Service is a centralized, hierarchical agency, this is
particularly compelling.12 3 In taking action, the Service need not
tailor its policy and decision-making processes in order to conform
to what any given judge, district or circuit may require.2 4 Additionally, forum shopping by those challenging the agency's decisions would be eliminated. 1 25 In the same vein, a specialized court
would result in coherence in NFMA's scheme. 1 26 Different from
consistency, coherence demands not uniformity of legal rules, but
rather a unitary vision of NFMA and its goals. 2 7 Both consistency
and coherence would promote the efficiency and uniformity that
1 28
Congress envisioned for the management of the national forests.
Second, a specialized court will produce expeditious decisions
while decreasing the caseload burdens of other courts. 1 29 Major
challenges to Forest Service actions can impose exceptional burdens on the courts.13 0 No one disputes that there has been a sharp
increase in the volume of litigation against the Forest Service since
Congress passed NFMA. Typically, the cases are very long, beginning with a request for preliminary injunctive relief and often continuing for years. A court well versed in the specialized issues
surrounding the litigation would be able to quickly resolve the
challenge, while allowing the Service to continue its management
efforts.
Finally, and likely the strongest argument in favor of a specialized court, is the potential for more accurate results in complex
areas of scientific facts and methodologies that face courts reviewing Forest Service decisions. Similar concerns prompted Congress,
when it passed the Clean Water Act, to request a study of the feasibility and desirability of establishing a specialized court with jurisdiction over environmental matters.13 ' As evidenced by the cases
122. David P. Currie & Frank I. Goodman, Judicial Review of Federal Administrative Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 65 (1975).
123. See Bruff, supra note 121, at 1195-97.
124. Id. at 1205-07.
125. Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking
System, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1111, 1116 (1990).
126. Id. at 1117.
127. Id.
128. See supra, Section I.
129. See Bruff, supra note 121, at 1228; see also Revesz, supra note 125, at 1120.
130. See Revesz, supra note 125, at 1120.
131. Such a court was never established. Scott C. Whitney, The Case for Creating a Special Environmental Court System, 14 WM. & MARY L. REV. 473, 475-504
(1973).
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described in section III, generalist judges are typically unwilling to
even look at the merits of scientific challenges to Forest Service
action. However, judges with technical backgrounds are more
likely to review challenges and underlying actions more critically,
with competence and confidence.
For all the positives that a proposed science court may offer,
there are potentially more compelling shortcomings. First, there is
significant commentary that suggests that a specialized court could
exhibit stronger biases than other generalist courts, particularly toward the Forest Service. 32 Much of the potential bias flows from
33 While
the mechanism by which federal judges are appointed.
the methods of appointing federal judges have been criticized because of the hazards of political influence, this would be aggravated
34
with respect to specialized appointments.
The President, with advice and consent of the Senate, appoints
judges.' 35 The Committee on the Judiciary has the responsibility
36 Addifor reviewing nominees for generalist federal judgeships.
tionally, the American Bar Association formally evaluates nominees.13 7 In both instances, the reviewing bodies draw on members
from a broad spectrum of the legal profession. However, in the
case of a specialized court, the bar groups concerned with the
court's jurisdiction will play the largest role in the recommendation
and appointment process. 38 As the groups with interest in cases
that fall within jurisdiction of a special court for reviewing forest
management decisions, both environmental and timber, represent
a narrow segment of the legal profession, "capture" of the court is
a greater possibility. 39 This is exacerbated by the fact that capture
capture of a
of a specialized court has greater potential impact than
40
system.'
multi-circuit
single court in the generalist,
132. See Bradford C. Mank, Protecting the Environment for Future Generations:
A Proposalfor a "Republican" Superagency, 5 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 444, 472 (1996)
(citing several articles discussing the considerable debate over whether the Tax Court

is biased in favor of the government). Id. at n.147.

133. Paul D. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The
Threat to the Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REv. 542, 606-07

(1969).
134. Id.
135. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl.1.
136. Revesz, supra note 125, at 1148 (citations omitted).
137. See id.
138. See id.; see also Ellen R. Jordan, Specialized Courts: A Choice?, 76 NW. U.
L. REv. 745, 748 (1981).
139. Revesz, supra note 125, at 1148-49.
140. See id.
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Moreover, there would likely be a similarity between the process
of nominating an agency head and of a specialized judge that will
ultimately review the agency head's decision.14 ' Therefore, those
interests that are able to influence the appointment of Forest Service officials would likely have the same successes with respect to
judges. As a result, review could prove to be a relatively empty
gesture. Further, because the Forest Service is within the Executive Branch, the Justice Department has an incentive to secure
nomination of judges sympathetic to the Forest Service enhancing
Justice's effectiveness as a lawyer for the agency. 42 Therefore, any
resulting bias wills likely flow toward the Forest Service. 43 Consequently, disenchantment with the present system based on the deference generalist judges accord the agency would not be remedied.
Further, the theory behind the success and utility of a specialized
science court is premised on the notion that it is possible to separate scientific facts from political, normative, and legal issues. 144
But, as alluded to earlier, "there is a 'large gray area between pure
science and pure policy' that cannot be addressed purely by scientific analysis because of scientific uncertainty or the presence of
economic or social factors.' 45 It is in this "gray area" that the Forest Service largely performs its duties, makes its decisions, and
takes action. Further, due to this complexity Congress delegated
rulemaking authority to the Forest Service. 46 Were judges in specialized courts to unrealistically attempt to separate the unseparable scientific, political, and legal issues, the foundation of
Separation of Powers may be disturbed. Scientific "experts" within
the agency are not restricted to technical matters, nor are generalist decision makers restricted to purely legal and normative issues. 147 Real decisions within the Forest Service can be the result
of compromise between competing interests and can occur from
141. See id. at 1151.
142. Id. at 1151-52.
143. See id. at 1152-53 (discussing the fact the Congress had similar fears about
the Government's influence over the Tax Court and, as a result, repeatedly considered prohibiting formal officials from serving on the court); see also Mank, supra note
132, at 472.
144. Abraham D. Sofaer, The Science Court.: Unscientific and Unsound, 9 ENVTL.
L. 1, 5-6 (1978); see also Yellin, supra note 121, 1305-08.
145. Mank, supra note 132, at 471 (quoting William Allen, Note, The Current
Federal Regulatory Frameworkfor Release of Genetically Altered Organisms Into the
Environment, 42 FLA. L. REV. 531, 537-38 (1990).

146. See supra, Sections I.B & II.A.1.
147. Yeilin, supra note 121, at 1313.

Fall 2000

Judicial Review of Forest Service Decisions

the top down. Scientific and technical advice can vary depending
on how the questions are asked. Therefore, the primary premise is
for a specialized court is false, making it a disappointing solution to
existing problems.
V.

CONCLUSION

The creation of a science court has been widely criticized, contains many potential downfalls, and the likelihood that a specialized court would ever be established to review Forest Service
actions seems grim, making it an unrealistic approach. A specialized court will not remedy many of the perceived problems with
present review of Forest Service action nor would it be likely to
stay within the confines of a properly functioning administrative
government. However, I do not believe that the super-deferential
approach evidenced by some courts in recent cases encourages the
reasoned decision making essential to the legitimacy of the Forest
Service's management decisions and required for the prosperity of
the nation's most precious resource.
The shortcomings present in judicial review can be addressed
within the existing legal framework by generalist judges. Most importantly, judges must truly and uniformly ensure that the Forest
Service has justified its substantive actions to the court in a logical,
coherent and succinct fashion rather than simply rolling over when
science is involved. The performance of this necessary judicial role
can take many forms and need not be overly intrusive. For example, courts could be more liberal in allowing review beyond the
record in appropriate circumstances. Along the same lines, the judiciary could grant de novo review under APA § 706(2)(F) to ascertain whether the Forest Service has complied with NFMA and
its regulations. a
Additionally, judges can appoint experts 149 and technical advisors 150 to aid in their understanding of the science involved in the
148. Overton Park has seemingly restricted the option to use of de novo review
under § 706(2)(F) in informal rulemaking to circumstances in which independent judicial fact finding is necessary. 401 U.S. at 415. Only one court has granted de novo

review since Overton Park; but see Fritz, supra note 46, at 30-35 (arguing that Overton
Parkmay not have restricted de novo review to the extent lower courts have assumed
and further that the dicta in the case is contrary to the APA's legislative history).
149. FRE 706 expressly authorizes court appointed experts.
150. The court has inherent authority to appoint technical advisors. See Reilly v.
United States, 863 F.2d 149, 154-55 (1st Cir. 1988); see also Federal Judicial Center,
Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence 531 (1994).
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litigation in order to better equip themselves to adequately review
Forest Services decisions. 15 1 Some have cautioned against this approach as the advisor or expert may have too great an influence on
the judge's decision. 5 a However, this could be mitigated to a considerable degree by ensuring that the parties participate in selection of the advisor and are present when the judge and expert or
advisor engage in dialogue. 53
On a more basic level, in some circumstances judges can rely on
NFMA and its regulations to evaluate whether the Forest Service
provided adequate reasons for its action. Because the statute and
regulations provide for such extensive procedure as well as some
substantive requirements, courts should ensure that the Service
fully complied before accepting decisions. For example, the extensive monitoring and assessment provisions allow a judge to determine whether the agency's decisions are appropriately based upon
its past management successes and failures. If the agency has not
complied with the requirements, then the court may find that the
agency has not articulated an adequate connection between the
facts and conclusions, or failed to consider all relevant factors. The
court could determine whether the agency satisfied its own procedural requirements designed to ensure it accounts for all valid scientific information available without having the court adjudge
substantive scientific matters. This may be an oversimplification
for many issues that arise. However, that does not preclude its effectiveness in the appropriate circumstances.
All in all, judicial review is only a final check on the process. No
matter what outcome any party or interest desires, judges can only
act within the bounds of the constitution and the existing administrative system. In the end, to guarantee more effective judicial supervision of Forest Service practices, Congress needs to establish
more definitively worded and concretely substantive management
standards.
151. Judge Marsh used a technical advisor in United States v. Oregon, 787 F.
Supp 1557 (D. Or. 1992). He explained that he utilized the advisors services merely
to familiarize himself with technological and biological issues that arose in the case
and that he did not ask for or receive the advisors opinion on any of the issues. See
Samuel H. Jackson, Technical Advisors Deserve Equal Billing with Court Appointed
Experts in Novel and Complex Scientific Cases: Does the FederalJudicial Center Agree,

28

ENVTL.

L. 431, 462 (1998).

152. See, e.g,. Patricia M. Wald, Making "Informed" Decisions on the District of
Columbia Circuit, 50 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 135, 152-54 (1982).
153. This was not the case with Judge Marsh and his technical advisor. Jackson,

supra note 151, at 462.

